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Coercive Competition: A New Paradigm for  
Culture and Conduct Risk Management 
Stephen Scott 
INTRODUCTION 
This Article offers a tour of a small portion of the literature that I 
have found particularly helpful in thinking about the importance of trust 
in society, about the hollowing-out of trust in our core social institutions 
since the Financial Crisis, and about what this means for business.  
Our survival as a species has hinged on an ability to cooperate with 
trusted others. Our thriving as a species has come as a consequence of our 
ability to collaborate with strangers, at scale, as a presumed behavioral 
norm. This is a recent phenomenon, made possible by the creation of a 
purpose-built institutional “trust infrastructure.” Without that to bind us, 
the very basis of shared peace and prosperity is lost. The collapse of trust 
in our core social institutions is therefore, in my view, the single greatest 
challenge of our day. 
With some focus on the banking sector, I will argue that a failure of 
risk governance lies behind this collapse in trust, and I will offer some 
suggestions as to how we might do better. While by design a philosophical 
inquiry and exploration, this Article has a practical goal: to challenge 
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precepts of modern management science; to put forth alternative theories; 
and to suggest that there is need—and opportunity—to establish a new 
paradigm for the management of risks that flow from company culture and 
the conduct that it promotes.  
Ultimately, this is an Article about human behavior, its causes and 
consequences. A subject so vast does not confine itself to any one, narrow, 
academic swim-lane and neither do I. Rather, I have afforded myself the 
luxury of borrowing liberally from a range of disciplines and their 
associated literatures, seeking to weave a coherent narrative that allows us 
to ask “what are we to do?” and to posit an approach to identifying 
responsive ideas that at least warrant some consideration. 
The Article is in three Parts: Zeitgeist, Weltanschauung, and Gestalt. 
In the first Part, Zeitgeist,1 I reflect on the spirit of our times, characterized 
by a contest between Forces of Connection and Forces of Division. Too 
often we tend to think of ourselves and our institutions in an atomistic 
manner; we fail to recognize that we are all connected in social 
ecosystems. We see this in the framing of the current corporate governance 
debate regarding the primacy of shareholder interests versus those of 
stakeholders, which is merely the most recent manifestation of a 
decades-long debate on this topic. The terms of this debate, I shall argue, 
reflect a persistent failure of philosophical imagination when it comes to 
apprehending the nature of the firm as a social ecosystem. 
In the next Part, Weltanschauung,2 I argue for a different worldview; 
one that asks after not only who and what the firm is for, but one that 
considers anew what the firm actually is. I characterize it as a nexus of 
trust relations and argue that the robust attention to the importance of trust 
that we have seen in the macro-economic context needs to be matched by 
a study of its significance at the micro-economic level of the individual 
firm or organization. Inextricably bound up in this argument is an 
appreciation of our history as a cooperative species—one that thrives due 
to its unique ability to create shared networks of collective intelligence 
among trusted peers—as I shall discuss in some depth. 
The closing Part, Gestalt,3 argues for bringing a holistic appreciation 
of the foregoing to our study of business management, particularly to 
management of the non-financial risks with which any organization must 
contend, and most especially those that are referred to as “culture and 
conduct risks.” I will argue that a failure to manage such risks successfully 
is among the principal causes of our current “Trust Crisis.” And I will note 
that this, in turn, stems from a failure to apprehend fully the social nature 
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of the human animal, and the way in which our social lives shape our 
identities and determine the norms of behavior to which we feel compelled 
to conform. 
I conclude the Article by arguing that those who are responsible for 
managing behavioral risk within organizations must begin by recognizing 
a “coercive competition” that shapes the parameters of their task. 
Employee conduct—or misconduct—is derived from a combination of 
formal mechanisms, such as incentive schemes and “tone from the top,” 
and far more powerful informal mechanisms, such as peer norms. While 
these mechanisms may work in concert to induce certain behaviors, it is 
perhaps more often so that they work in opposition, leaving employees 
pulled in different directions. I shall briefly discuss new capabilities in the 
field of computational social science that make possible an examination of 
this complex interplay of formal and informal coercive systems, thus 
providing a powerful new means by which to manage organizations. In 
time, the application of such tools to the management of culture and 
conduct-related risks may help restore trustworthiness to our institutions 
and help to free us from the Distrust Trap. 
It should be noted that I am not a lawyer, economist, organizational 
psychologist, nor an academic of any pedigree. I am just a guy who reads 
a lot and who is trying to make a difference. If this Article stimulates any 
reactions from those who may truly be called “scholar,” I shall consider it 
a success. 
I. ZEITGEIST 
A. The Freak of the Universe 
Homo sapiens likes to believe that it is different, special, better, 
other. We are wrong in this but perhaps understandably so. For if there is 
anything truly distinct about the human animal, then surely it lies in our 
capacity for narrative—–and especially for that of the inward sort: the 
stories we tell ourselves about ourselves, about one another, about our 
world, and about our place within it. 
It is central to these inner-dramas and psycho-dynamic myths that we 
are, each of us, doomed to play the part of the protagonist. In that role, we 
most often see our-selfs as separate and distinct, rather than forming a part 
of some consequential whole. This self-absorption lies not just within our 
nature but may be the very essence of it: as that genius observer Erich 
Fromm put it, “Man is the only animal for whom his own existence is a 
problem which he has to solve and from which he cannot escape.”4 Fromm 
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traces this to the development of reason, which resulted in what he calls 
an “historical dichotomy”: 
Self-awareness, reason and imagination have disrupted the 
“harmony” which characterizes animal existence. Their emergence 
has made man into an anomaly, into the freak of the universe. He is 
a part of nature, subject to her physical laws and unable to change 
them, yet he transcends the rest of nature. He is set apart while being 
a part . . . .5 
Our error is to emphasize Fromm’s “set apart-ness” over his “being 
a part-ness.” We give primacy to the individual self over all of its brethren, 
over the natural world from which each and all emerge, and within which 
all of our narrative-selfs are set and made possible. Instead, the human 
animal must be considered against all other social animals—the ants, bees, 
dolphins, wolves, horses, elephants, some birds, other primates (of 
course), and more. Like them, we emerge from and exist within 
fundamentally social ecosystems, outside of which we are most likely to 
perish.6 
This is not idle philosophizing. Fromm’s existential dilemma is at the 
very center of current civic, political, and economic crises and debates. 
Journalist David Brooks describes this struggle in terms of a “New Cold 
War,” one between the Forces of Connection and the Forces of Division.7 
He chronicles an “epidemic” of alienation, loneliness, and distrust that has 
left our social fabric in tatters. “The chief struggle of the day,” he writes, 
“is sociological and psychological, not ideological or economic.”8 He then 
adds this crucial observation: “The substrate layer of American society—
the network of relationships and connection and trust that everything else 
relies upon—is failing. And the results are as bloody as any war.”9 
Business is a social endeavor, so no meaningful discussion of 
corporate governance can be divorced from these broader themes of 
connection and division. I take them, therefore, as my starting point and 
carry these ideas throughout the following Article, which considers them 
in connection with their implications for business management, allowing 
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me to conclude with a suggested new paradigm for culture and conduct 
risk management. 
B. We Are Not Alone 
Across the globe, business leaders appear newly alive to the idea that 
we are social creatures who thrive (or fail to) within “social-ecological 
systems”10 or “shared communities of fate.”11 Increasingly, the “set apart-
ness” of a given firm is seen as subsidiary to the “being a part-ness” of the 
social ecology within which these “artificial persons” reside and upon 
which they depend. 
Blackrock’s Larry Fink is credited with advancing the current tone 
in his January 2018 annual letter to the boards of the world’s largest 
companies, in which he argued, “To prosper over time, every company 
must not only deliver financial performance, but also show how it makes 
a positive contribution to society.”12 Those failing in this, he warned, “will 
ultimately lose the license to operate from key stakeholders.”13 
Fink doubled down in his 2019 letter. Observing that we are in the 
midst of the largest wealth transfer in history—$24 trillion from baby 
boomers to millennials—he notes that the younger generation has different 
investment preferences than the older and places greater emphasis on 
environmental, social, and governance issues (ESG) that will be 
“increasingly material to corporate valuations.”14 Fink ties his assertions 
here to a remarkably communal view of corporate purpose: “Purpose 
unifies management, employees, and communities. It drives ethical 
behavior and creates an essential check on actions that go against the best 
interests of stakeholders. Purpose guides culture, provides a framework for 
consistent decision-making, and, ultimately, helps sustain long-term 
financial returns for the shareholders of your company.”15 
Fink gives corporate purpose force. He argues not only that purpose 
establishes the pre-conditions for effective corporate governance but, by 
inference, he asserts that only those management decisions and actions that 
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are consistent with a firm’s purpose will advance the interests of its 
shareholders sustainably—and thus, will necessarily also advance the 
interests of its broader stakeholder communities. Corporate purpose, in 
other words, articulates and enlivens the firm’s ecological “being a part-
ness.” 
Few have taken up this theme as passionately and thoughtfully as 
Oxford’s Colin Mayer, who criticizes past economic orthodoxy for its 
failure to fully apprehend that which most enhances human well-being. “It 
focuses on individualism when the purpose of life derives from 
community,” Mayer writes.16 Through his Future of the Corporation 
program, hosted by the British Academy, Mayer is working to foment and 
to facilitate a “paradigm shift” in how the firm is conceived and 
governed.17 He puts corporate purpose at center: “[a] company’s 
governance is indeterminate so long as its purposes are undefined.”18 
Fink’s exhortations and Mayer’s activism reflect our Zeitgeist, which 
was given its most recent expression by the Business Roundtable (BRT), 
an association of the CEOs at America’s most prominent firms. In its 
recently-issued Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation19—a 
“modernizing” update to its 1997 Principals of Corporate Governance—
the BRT refutes the so-called Friedman Doctrine, which holds that “there 
is one and only one social responsibility of business—to use its resources 
and engage in activities designed to increase its profits.”20 
Consistent with Friedman, the BRT had previously maintained that 
“[t]he paramount duty of management and of boards of directors is to the 
corporation’s stockholders,” and that “interests of other stakeholders are 
relevant as a derivative of the duty to stockholders.”21 Its new Statement 
overturns decades of such “shareholder primacy” orthodoxy to assert a 
“multi-stakeholder model” of corporate purpose, one that commits 
member firms to work towards “creating value for customers, investing in 
employees, fostering diversity and inclusion, dealing fairly with suppliers, 
                                                     
 16. COLIN MAYER, PROSPERITY: BETTER BUSINESS MAKES THE GREATER GOOD 11 (2018). 
 17. About Future of the Corporation, BRITISH ACAD., https://www.thebritishacademy.ac.uk/ 
programmes/future-of-the-corporation/about [https://perma.cc/HCV7-8GBJ]. Full disclosure: I am 
delighted to have been invited to play a small part in the deliberations of the community of thinkers 
that Professor Mayer has curated. 
 18. MAYER, supra note 16, at 19. 
 19. Our Commitment: Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation, BUS. ROUNDTABLE, 
https://opportunity.businessroundtable.org/ourcommitment/ [https://perma.cc/EJN3-3DS3]. 
 20. Milton Friedman, A Friedman doctrine—The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase 
its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32. 
 21. Peter Gasca, In This Single Statement, CEOs From the Largest U.S. Corporations Just 
Changed the Purpose of Business, INC. (Aug. 20, 2019), https://www.inc.com/peter-gasca/in-this-
single-statement-ceos-from-largest-us-corporations-just-changed-purpose-of-business.html [https:// 
perma.cc/AF8D-QMJ3]. 
2020] Coercive Competition 771 
supporting communities, and protecting the environment.”22 Notably, it 
makes reference to all these purposes before even mentioning 
shareholders.23 
The backlash to BRT’s statement was as immediate as it must have 
been expected: unnecessary; fool-hardy; disingenuous; petty posturing 
driven by political calculus. “Accountability to everyone means 
accountability to no one,” the Council of Institutional Investors fretted.24 
Though the Council accepted that it is “critical to respect stakeholders,” it 
warned that business leaders must have “clear accountability to company 
owners.”25 
C. Once More, with Feeling 
The debate will no doubt continue, but there is little here that is new. 
Rather, this current contest should be seen as a continuation of that Great 
Debate of the early 1930s, between Adolf A. Berle and E. Merrick Dodd, 
conducted amidst the Great Depression and ultimately forming the 
intellectual backdrop against which modern securities law took shape. 
In what has since been cast as arguing for shareholder-primacy, in 
1931 Berle wrote that managerial authority is “necessarily and at all times 
exercisable only for the ratable benefit of all shareholders as their interest 
appears.”26 Dodd’s 1932 rejoinder effectively argued that, once given the 
status of legal personhood, a firm is no longer a mere aggregation of 
shareholders but must be seen as enjoying what is, in effect, a civic life 
with attendant civic duties. Thus, the case for stakeholder-primacy: the 
firm is “an economic institution which has a social service as well as a 
profit-making function,” Dodd concludes.27 
As others have pointed out, the two men had more in common than 
the nuanced views that separated them.28 But at a time when policy-makers 
were concerned with restoring confidence in markets among the investing 
public, fluttering like two moths around a shared flame, Berle and Dodd 
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were preoccupied with how best to control managers amidst what would 
later be called “asymmetries of information.”29 They were concerned, that 
is, with problems of agency which turned on concerns about management 
power. 
In hindsight, the two might be seen as sides of a coin: Berle 
concerned for the harm that “real people”—managers—might cause the 
more abstruse corpus of “shareholders”; while on the flip-side, Dodd is 
seen as more concerned for the harm that an abstract “legal person”—the 
firm—might visit upon the real people who make up its community of 
interested stakeholders. Both were seeking to avoid harm that might occur 
within different parts of a shared ecosystem, with each prioritizing a 
different element. 
Lacking that ecological perspective, the debate was cast in “either-
or” terms, and that artificially-binary formulation persists in current 
echoes of the Great Debate. In the end, it was Berle who was seen to have 
“won” the contest, and who was asked to serve among the Brain Trust that 
FDR assembled and tasked with establishing the set of policy prescriptions 
that ultimately came together to form the Securities Act of 1933, and which 
thus established the basics for corporate law that remains with us today.30 
II. WELTANSCHAUUNG 
A. When You Change the Way You Look at Things . . . 
We have inherited a rich and subtle literature in the field of corporate 
governance that starts by asking, “For whom is the firm?” (e.g., the 
shareholder v. stakeholder debate—a legalistic inquiry). To this, 
especially latterly, is added an important dialogue that starts by asking, 
“For what is the firm?”31 (an examination of purpose—predominantly an 
economic inquiry). But if we are to re-examine such first-order questions, 
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overturn established orthodoxies, and trial new formulations, then we are 
remiss if we fail to take a step farther back to ask, “What is the firm?” 
(fundamentally, a philosophical inquiry). 
If Man is “the freak of the universe,” then the corporate “legal 
person” is more freakish yet, and must too explain its own existence.32 
Since Coase penned The Nature of the Firm33 in 1937, we have tended 
towards a bloodless, legalistic view of it as a nesting of contractual 
obligations that works to minimize “transaction costs.”34 In fairness, this 
formulation has been critiqued and debated since Coase’s writing, and 
Coase himself felt his ideas were often misconstrued.35 Nevertheless, this 
mechanistic perspective prevails in economic orthodoxy.36 
Until now, when all such orthodoxies appear to be under assault, 
from within and without. Renowned economist Mohammed A. El-Erian 
sees society’s loss of confidence in orthodox economics (and economists) 
as a consequence of the profession’s predilection for “simplistic 
theoretical assumptions,” its reliance on mathematical techniques “that 
prize elegance over real-world applicability,” and its “routine failure” to 
draw on insights from behavioral science.37 This self-selected idiographic 
“insularity” from other fields of inquiry leaves economics poorer and 
economists distrusted, writes Bank of England Chief Economist Andy 
Haldane.38 “The intellectual marketplace awaits a fresh approach to the 
structuring of work and the good society,” argues Sebastian Mallaby, 
fellow for international economics at the Council on Foreign Relations, in 
a recent piece entitled How Economist’s Faith in Markets Broke 
America.39 
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The law is meant to codify our ideas about how human affairs are 
best managed so that they work to promote our values. The law provides 
the scaffolding for our institutional and economic structures, but the 
ultimate design-work belongs to the humanities. We need a fleshy, 
humanistic theory of the firm, one that is organic rather than mechanistic. 
“In a world in which contracts are incomplete, unenforceable, or 
infeasible, then the ability to commit to and sustain relations of trust is 
critical to the scope of economic activity,” argues Colin Mayer.40 “The 
corporation is not a ‘nexus of contracts’ between the parties to the firm,” 
he adds. “It is the opposite; it is a nexus of relations. Those relations are 
built on trust.”41 
Mayer is most assuredly correct, in my view. And, this “nexus of 
relations” formulation overcomes some of the sterility in the Berle and 
Dodd debate and the mechanistic emphases of Coase. But trust is not 
something that lends itself readily to econometric analysis. The 
economist’s treatment of trust starts most often from a macro-economic 
perspective; the literature regarding the significance of trust in micro-
economic analyses is sparse by comparison. 
Trust is a phenomenon that belongs to Fromm’s “being a part-ness,” 
and too often this relational dynamic has been incidental to, or wholly 
ignored by, “serious” inquiries into the nature of the firm. But as Max 
Planck once said, “When you change the way you look at things, the things 
you look at change.” And we are beginning to look at things anew. 
B. Trust Issues 
Economists have long acknowledged the importance of trust in 
economic life. Nobel Prize winner Kenneth Arrow was among the first 
modern economists to emphasize the significance of trust in our day-to-
day transactions.42 In 1972, he argued that “Virtually every commercial 
transaction has within itself an element of trust, certainly any transaction 
conducted over a period of time,” adding—not insignificantly for my 
purposes here—“It can be plausibly argued that much of the economic 
backwardness in the world can be explained by the lack of mutual 
confidence.”43 Where trust is wanting, we are impoverished. 
Some twenty years later, Francis Fukuyama argued for the 
significance of trust in the realm of economic life, defining it as, “the 
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expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest, and 
cooperative behavior, based on commonly shared norms, on the part of 
members of that community.”44 Fukuyama describes trust as a sort of 
informal “currency” that facilitates exchange and supports the cooperation 
that is central to creating and maintaining social order. Trust provides a 
kind of “social glue” that allows for the smooth functioning of groups, 
firms, organizations, and institutions.45 
In short, trust allows for activities that would not occur without it. 
And while this may be true in our day-to-day transactions and for the 
functioning of whole economic orders, it is true also in connection with 
more idiosyncratic and micro-economic considerations, such as the 
functioning of firms and even a given firm’s value in the market context. 
Trust is thus a “material” business consideration. 
“Trust matters first because companies are at the bedrock of our 
communities and our economies,” writes Greg Medcraft, head of the 
OECD’s Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs.46 “But trust in 
business also matters because, more and more, a company’s reputation is 
a major part of its share price and a key source of competitive 
advantage.”47 This is all the more so the case, Medcraft observes, when 
some 85% of the market value of the S&P 500 is estimated to be made up 
of intangible value. That is over $21 trillion in value that is largely 
derivative of the trust consumers place in a brand and the company behind 
it.48 A recent study from Accenture ties a loss of such trust in business to 
a financial loss that it estimates “conservatively” at $180 billion.49 
So, trust matters for transactions and markets, for the development 
and functioning of economic systems, and for the value assigned to and 
sustained by a firm. It is, therefore, a significant worry that Gallup reports 
businesses worldwide to be suffering from a crisis in trust50—a view heard 
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throughout the last year. In its 2018 Annual Report, for instance, the IMF 
argued, “Global economic momentum is under pressure from a slow 
erosion [or] weakening of trust in institutions—and trust, of course, is the 
lifeblood of any economy.”51 The World Bank’s annual Spring Meetings 
featured discussion of risks to the global financial system coming as a 
consequence of what participants termed the “distrust trap.”52 In an 
address to the General Assembly, U.N. Secretary General António 
Guterres argued that the world is suffering from a “Trust Deficit 
Disorder.”53 That theme that was echoed repeatedly in Davos as 2019 got 
started.54 And again, later in the year, when the OECD announced the 
launch of a “Trust in Business Initiative.”55 
C. Illusions of Understanding 
But while the importance of trust in the macro-economic context has 
won greater attention in recent years, our consideration of its importance 
at the micro-economic level of the firm has received comparatively far less 
study. Where such attention to trust is given, the tendency is to inquire into 
trust as a driver of brand value; that is, we focus on trust in a company 
from among those outside of it, rather than attending to the significance of 
trust within the company among those who make it up. But if Colin Mayer 
is correct in arguing for the firm as a “nexus of relations,” then the trust 
dynamics that define those relations are of paramount importance. And to 
appreciate the existential significance of trust in this context, it is helpful 
to take a step back—a big one. 
“We assume that a large brain, the use of tools, superior learning 
abilities and complex social structures are huge advantages,” writes Yuval 
Noah Harari.56 “But humans enjoyed all of these advantages for a full 2 
million years during which they remained weak and marginal creatures.”57 
What changed? Harari argues that an understanding of human history from 
the time of the Agricultural Revolution to the present really boils down to 
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this single question: “How did humans organize themselves in mass 
cooperation networks?”58 The answer is found in our having developed a 
successful means for institutionalizing relations of trust, first with kith and 
kin, and later with strangers.59 
 Here, Harari emphasizes research by Robin Dunbar, the 
evolutionary anthropologist who gained renown for his work on the 
“social brain hypothesis” and its implications for human social orders.60 
For reasons that fall outside my scope here, Dunbar concludes that the 
nature of the human brain is such that we are able to maintain close 
relationships with, on average, about 150 people—the so-called “Dunbar 
Number.” These relationships are arranged in a hierarchy of sorts, which 
Dunbar depicts as concentric rings marked by decreasing emotional 
intensity as we move farther from the center of our social worlds.61 
“We only see each of the 100 individuals in the outer 150 layer of 
our social networks approximately twice a year, whereas, on average, we 
see each of the members of our innermost circle of 5 every other day,” 
Dunbar has observed through a series of fascinating studies. “Between 
them, these five people account for around 40 per cent of all our social 
effort—and our emotional capital. The outermost [150] layer accounts for 
less than 20 per cent of our social effort,” Dunbar writes.62 
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 Figure 1: Dunbar Dynamics 
Devotion of emotional energy to a small, core cadre of trusted peers 
was evolutionarily advantageous. “It takes a tribe to raise a human,” as 
Yuval Noah Harari puts it. “Evolution thus favored those capable of form-
ing strong social ties.”63 With reference to Dunbar, Harari argues that “re-
liable information about who could be trusted meant that small bands 
could expand into larger bands and Sapiens could develop tighter and more 
sophisticated types of cooperation.”64 This was crucial to our survival as a 
species. 
Central to our ability to thrive as a species is that we devised an 
institutional means by which to extend our circles of trust more broadly, 
through transitive properties of trust: I trust a guy who trusts a guy who 
trusts a guy.65 “[T]rust cannot be purely bilateral: trust between any two 
people rests on a web of trust between each of them and the others with 
whom they also deal,” writes economist Paul Seabright.66 “[T]rust is the 
mortar for most of the encounters between strangers in a modern society,” 
he argues.67 It is achieved through cultural dictates that encourage and 
support cooperation as a behavioral norm, and those cultural dictates are 
enlivened through human institutions that were established specifically to 
serve this very function, if not always conscientiously.68 As a result of this 
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institutionalized trust, “Sapiens can cooperate in extremely flexible ways 
with countless numbers of strangers,” Harari writes. “That’s why Sapiens 
rules the world.”69 
What is true of our evolutionary past is true of our current enterprises. 
“All the structures of which we are a part—congresses, universities, the 
companies where we work, our minds, even—are merely temporary 
collections of relations,” writes Joshua Cooper Ramo.70 And these 
collections of relations permit us to accomplish extraordinary things. “[I]t 
was the collective intelligence of human groups, not the intelligence of 
individual humans, that first differentiated our human ancestors from all 
their animal relatives,” writes Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s 
Thomas Malone.71 He calls groups with such collective intelligence 
“Superminds.” 
Malone’s Superminds permeate our social world. They are found 
wherever purposeful, thoughtful human endeavor is found. Even at the 
level of individual projects, we rely on the collective intelligence that we 
are able to access through others. “[I]ndividuals store very little detailed 
information in their heads,” write Steven Sloman and Philip Fernbach in 
The Knowledge Illusion.72 “In that sense, people are like bees and society 
a beehive: our intelligence resides not in individual brains but in the 
collective mind.”73 Indeed, “shared knowledge itself is a good marker of 
community membership,” Dunbar observes.74 And because our individual 
knowledge is enmeshed with that of others, “it is the community that 
shapes our beliefs and attitudes.”75  
Most often, we fail to recognize this, but it is critical to our 
understanding of any human undertaking. We believe that we are the sole 
authors of our own thinking and problem-solving. We emphasize our 
“being apart-ness.” And we are wrong to do so. “Social intelligence 
enhanced by group selection made Homo sapiens the first fully dominant 
species in Earth’s history,” writes the preeminent biologist Edward O. 
Wilson.76 
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The firm’s essence is that of a nexus of relationships. It functions 
through human ties from which a collective intelligence emerges. It is a 
Supermind. Or, more accurately, it is a nested aggregation of Superminds. 
And its performance turns on the sustained trust relationships that bind its 
members. “Our sense of self, our ‘heart and intuition,’ is actually part of 
what ensures that most of us will conform to group norms, promoting 
social harmony,” writes social neuroscientist Matt Lieberman.77 “Our self 
works for the group to ensure that we will fit in.”78 Unconscious of this, 
however, we operate with what Sloman and Fernbach call “an illusion of 
understanding.”79 
We must shake off this illusion, apprehend the true nature of the firm 
as a community, as a nexus of relations, and we must consider closely the 
trust dynamics—the social capital80—that exists and is traded among 
members, facilitating a “we is greater than me” psychosocial 
predisposition.81 “Economists have long studied human capital as a driver 
of productivity in organizations,” Lieberman notes, but “most studies of 
human capital ignore the concept of social capital, the social connections 
and social networks within the organization.” Is it human capital alone that 
leads to productivity increase, Lieberman asks, “or does social capital play 
a role in catalyzing human output into optimal performance?”82 
III. GESTALT 
A. She Who Must Be Obeyed 
In his 1953 essay, The Methodology of Positive Economics, Milton 
Friedman argued that economic theories should be judged by their ability 
to predict behavior correctly: “The only relevant test of the validity of a 
hypothesis is comparison of its predictions with experience.”83 By this 
measure, alas, we must judge the social sciences harshly.84 
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Consider the failure of economists to anticipate the Financial Crisis, 
leading Britain’s Queen Elizabeth to ask, famously, “why did nobody 
notice it?”85 An accomplished group of British economists later wrote in 
reply to Her Majesty, explaining that the profession’s failure to anticipate 
the Crisis had resulted from “a failure of the collective imagination of 
many bright people, both in this country and internationally, to understand 
the risks to the system as a whole.”86 That is, economists and risk managers 
had failed to take an eco-systemic view of the global financial system, or 
at least a sufficiently well-informed one. 
“People expect from the social sciences—anthropology, sociology, 
economics, and political science—the knowledge to understand their lives 
and control their future. They want the power to predict,” writes E. O. 
Wilson.87 Yet our economic models leave us persistently flat-footed. 
Wilson contends that our economic models have failed us for having been 
“sealed off from the complexities of human behavior and the constraints 
imposed by the environment.” For too long, studies in the social sciences 
have been conducted without sufficient appeal to the natural sciences, he 
argues. The solution lies in what Wilson refers to as consilience: “the 
linking of facts and fact-based theory across disciplines to create a 
common groundwork of explanation.”88 
Noble Prize-winning economist Robert Solow sounded a similar note 
nearly fifty years ago. “I imagine that biochemistry and biophysics got 
started,” he wrote, “not because someone thought that biology should be 
interdisciplinary as a matter of principle, but because concrete research 
problems arose on the borderline of the biological and the chemical or 
physical.”89 Similarly, our deepest challenges today sit at the borderline of 
the social and the natural sciences.  
Perhaps nowhere is this more evident than in the seemingly 
interminable parade of misconduct scandals that fill the headlines—
particularly in the financial industry, where punitive fines for misconduct 
are estimated to total nearly $400 billion in the last several years.90 How 
is it that these problems have not yet been managed away? 
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I contend that it is due to a failure to achieve consilience between the 
natural and social sciences. Instead, we embrace denuded models of 
human dynamics that take Fromm’s “being apart-ness” as their starting 
point. We imagine solitary Homo economicus, rationally calculating how 
best to respond to one-dimensional incentives (almost always conceived 
of in monetary terms), aiming to maximize immediate economic utility in 
a mechanistic context. This leaves us believing that management science 
need only concern itself with setting these incentives properly and desired 
behaviors will follow, inevitably. As I have argued elsewhere, these ideas 
are manifestly, demonstrably, repeatedly, and maddeningly wrong.91 
“The intellectual conception of the corporation from Adam Smith to 
the present is fundamentally wrong,” Mayer veritably shouts from his 
pages.92 “We economists have witnessed the failure of our profession, a 
failure that needs to be analyzed and fixed,” writes renowned economist 
Luigi Zingales.93 “The practice of management has been stuck in time for 
more than 30 years,” Gallup laments.94 
As Francis Bacon instructed nearly 400 years ago: “[N]ature is only 
to be commanded by obeying her.”95 Until we appreciate that all human 
behaviors are fundamentally and unavoidably shaped by our social 
nature,96 we will manage our enterprises sub-optimally. We will manage 
behavioral risks sub-optimally and persistently from the back foot. 
Misconduct scandals will continue unabated, and the public’s faith in our 
most essential organizations and institutions will erode further. The “Trust 
Crisis” will worsen.97 
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B. Embracing Complexity 
The problem is one of complexity.98 “Knowing the parts is not 
equivalent to knowing the whole,” complexity scientist John Miller 
advises. “To truly understand hives, markets, and brains, we need to 
understand how the interactions of honeybees, traders, and neurons result 
in system-wide, aggregate behavior.”99 And to understand firms, we need 
to understand the interaction dynamics among those within them.100 
Complicated systems may have many moving parts, but they follow 
a fairly stable, linear set of rules, much like algorithms that follow an 
“if/then” logic. Complex systems, by contrast, are non-linear and are 
characterized by “a subtle dynamic interplay of positive feedback, 
negative feedback, and cascading chain reactions.”101 Any human 
organization is a complex system. We are joined in a network of 
interactions with others. Those interactions—and our expectations of 
future interactions—influence our behavior. This, then, influences the 
responsive behavior of others throughout the organization in a ripple-
effect that, in turn, results in emergent systemic change—which, then, 
further (re-)shapes our interactions. 
In complex systems, emergent outcomes arise through the interplay 
between any given agent with any other agent(s). Those emergent 
outcomes influence the subsequent behavior of all agents, who respond to 
one another’s responses to such influence, in a ceaseless series of 
interactions that work either to reinforce the emergent outcomes or to 
prompt new ones, which alter the system yet again.102  
Though we may be able to apprehend this network of interactions 
cognitively, it is hard to operationalize the implications of complexity in 
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practical management processes.103 Thus, “we tolerate complexity by 
failing to recognize it.”104 Traditional management science fails to 
acknowledge all we have learned about the principal adaptive quality of 
our species: its eusociality. And because it operates in a manner that is 
“sealed off from the complexities of human behavior,” management 
science repeatedly fails us.105  
We must learn to embrace complexity. We exist almost exclusively 
within social ecologies.106 All of our endeavors involve coming together 
in complex networks of mutual trust.107 We habitually join with others to 
form Superminds that extend individual capacities into evolutionarily 
advantageous “super-abilities” that put Homo sapiens at the top of the 
evolutionary ladder. This informs our inner lives of private experience: it 
shapes, and in many ways, defines our very selfs. As such, the self is social, 
and the experience of our innermost individuality (our “set apart-ness”) is 
largely an emergent property flowing from our existence within complex 
adaptive groups (our “being a part-ness”)—groups that have their own 
existential imperatives. 
 
C. The Company that Keeps You . . . 
“[P]eople must belong to a tribe; they yearn to have a purpose larger 
than themselves,” Wilson writes. “We are obliged by the deepest drives of 
the human spirit to make ourselves more than just animated dust, and we 
must have a story to tell about where we came from, and why we are 
here.”108 
This is Fromm’s existential dilemma. And, as I have sought to argue 
here, the answers that we craft and pose in seeking to address it—the 
stories we tell ourselves and one another about “why we are here”—are 
necessarily social stories, even if we may seek to convince ourselves 
otherwise. Our sense of identity, our perceptions of self, are social 
constructs. We may experience them privately, but they would not exist 
outside the set of relations within which our selfs are enmeshed and from 
which they are fashioned. We acknowledge this, albeit obliquely, when 
we say, “you are the company you keep.” But I believe that we have this 
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precisely backwards; rather, we should say, “you are the company that 
keeps you.” 
Wilson urges us to work towards a unity of knowledge across the 
social and natural sciences. So, let us consider what the social sciences 
have taught us: the single most powerful human drive is the drive to 
belong.109 We see this in the earliest development of infants and 
children.110 Our evolutionary history is such that social exclusion is 
existentially terrifying.111 We respond to ostracism as we do to physical 
pain, and chronic exposure leaves us with lasting feelings of helplessness, 
hopelessness, and depression.112 One study has found that, even in a game 
with a computer, experiencing ostracism is sufficient to trigger lower 
levels of self-esteem. “We interpret these results as strong evidence for a 
very primitive and automatic adaptive sensitivity to even the slightest hint 
of social exclusion,” the authors conclude.113 
And now let us consider lessons from natural science. Stanford’s 
Robert Sapolsky is one of the leading professors of biology and neurology 
in the world and a recipient of the MacArthur Foundation’s genius grant. 
Sapolsky observes that the brain region most involved in feeling fear and 
anxiety, the amygdala, is also the region most involved in generating 
aggression.114 “The amygdala,” he tells us, “is particularly sensitive to 
unsettling circumstances that are social.”115 The amygdala also works, in 
partnership with the insular cortex, to process our experience of disgust.116 
“The insula activates when we eat a cockroach or imagine doing so,” 
Sapolsky writes.117 And this very same cerebral circuitry engages when 
we experience some-one as disgusting. “The insula and amygdala activate 
when we think of the neighboring tribe as loathsome cockroaches,” 
Sapolsky continues.118 “This is central to how our brains process ‘us’ and 
‘them.’”119 
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Nicholas Christakis, director of Yale’s Human Nature Lab, is a 
distinguished sociologist and medical doctor. He is deeply familiar with 
both the social and the natural sciences. Christakis is an optimist. In 
Blueprint, he outlines a “social suite” of human behavioral predilections 
that have worked throughout our species’ history to promote the 
development of collaborative social orders.120 However, as Christakis 
observes, studies find that, even when very young children are assigned to 
distinct teams—the red shirts and the blue shirts, in one such study—“us-
versus-them” behaviors appear.121 “In-group affection and out-group 
hatred seem entangled,” he laments, even when group assignment is 
wholly arbitrary and known to be so.122 
To be ostracized is to be deemed disgusting. To be deemed 
disgusting leads to being ostracized. We may be able to tolerate this from 
the neighboring tribe—“the blue shirts”—but when this occurs among 
those within the innermost of our Dunbar social circles, it is unbearable. 
Thus, we do what we must to “fit in” and to maintain in-group status; to 
avoid ostracism. We achieve this by cooperating with our peers and 
conforming to their established norms of behavior. Our social nature leads 
to a “normative compliance”123 in our actions: we behave such that we 
may remain welcome among and embraced by our trusted peer groups 
within each of our social domains. 
“The preponderance of the evidence—both observational and 
experimental—supports the hypothesis that we cooperate primarily 
because we crave reward (engagement) and fear punishment (exclusion) 
from other members of our group,” writes the renowned security 
technologist Bruce Schneier.124 The natural sciences and the social 
sciences agree: we are social beings to the core, our very identity is 
socially-bounded, and therefore a threat to our social connectedness is a 
threat to our very identity.125 
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D. Identity Economics 
Nobel prize-winning economist George Akerlof writes of a “missing 
motivation” in macroeconomic thought, arguing that traditional theories 
fail to give adequate attention to social norms in shaping our behavior.126 
Consideration of the imperative of normative compliance in the context of 
the utility function imparts a necessary balance to macroeconomics and 
affords “due account of the purposefulness of human decisions,” he 
writes.127 “Sociology is dense in examples of people’s views as to how 
they and others should behave, their joy when they live up to those 
standards, and their discomfort and reactions when they fail to do so,” he 
adds.128 And since group norms establish a behavioral ideal, Akerlof 
concludes, the utility function must allow for “a loss in utility dependent 
on the distance of behavior from that ideal.”129 
This notion from the social science of economics comports with 
Dunbar’s findings in the natural science of evolutionary anthropology. 
“Many of our solutions to the problems of survival and successful 
reproduction are social,” he writes, “and social solutions require an 
intermediate step—making sure that the community pulls together.”130 In 
the consilient perspective urged upon us by Wilson, the “rational actor” is 
thus one who internalizes the behavioral norms of peers and acts in a 
manner consistent with those norms.131 
Evidence that we act to maximize the utility of in-group status 
through behavioral conformity abounds, ranging from the ridiculous to the 
absurd. Studies find that people conform to behavioral norms even when 
they are wholly arbitrary, leading researchers to conclude that, “identity is 
not stable but is instead driven by context.”132 For instance, studies show 
that we tend to order more food in a restaurant if our waiter is obese: 
physical appearance signals a norm for excessive consumption.133 Other 
studies find that, when we order the same dish as one another in a 
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restaurant, we are later more inclined to trust one another.134 And when we 
partake of communal dishes in a shared meal, cooperation increases 
thereafter.135 This “shared plates, shared minds” phenomenon both reflects 
and serves to promote trust and collaboration;136 our beneficial eusociality. 
“In economics and in the remainder of the social sciences as well, the 
translation from individual to aggregate behavior is the key analytic 
problem,” writes Wilson.137 “Yet in these disciplines the exact nature and 
sources of individual behavior are rarely considered.”138 What I have 
sought to illustrate here is that the sources of individual behavior are 
social. “Experiments in social psychology, and now increasingly in 
economics,” Akerlof writes, “show that individuals’ behavior depends on 
who people think they are.”139 Thus, if we wish to understand aggregate 
behavior in any organizational context, we must enquire into the identity 
dynamics that are at work—for even individual identity is social in nature.  
The “nexus of relationships” within which we reside imprints upon 
us a series of contextual identities that influence how we behave in a given 
social or organizational setting. “A gain in identity utility can represent the 
enjoyment people experience when they do something that makes them fit 
in with a group,” Akerlof observes.140 (It is good to be one of us.) “It also 
can represent the gains from differentiating one group from another.”141 (It 
is good not to be one of them.) The conclusion is that identity utility 
“derives from group processes.”142 
“Identities reside in relations with others: you-me and us-them,” 
Tilly tells us.143 We are primed by evolution to maintain in-group status 
among networks of trusted peers, and we achieve this through normative 
compliance and a cooperative pre-disposition.144 To fail in this is to be 
ostracized, to be deemed “disgusting,” to be expelled from the social 
ecologies that shape our identities, and thus to experience a threat to our 
very sense of self(s). 
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Regrettably, this has a dark side: a “common is moral” heuristic. Our 
views of what is “right” or “wrong” depends less than we might think on 
personal moral views. Rather, behavior that is deemed to be “right” is that 
behavior which is witnessed among peers—and the more often it is seen, 
the more right it must be. “A selfish behavior that was common was judged 
as more moral than when rare,” one study found, “and an altruistic 
behavior that was rare was judged as less moral than when common.”145  
That is, we go along to get along, and research finds that this identity 
dynamic promotes “conditional dishonesty.”146 People will cheat or act 
otherwise unethically—even if contrary to their own sincerely held moral 
views—when acting dishonestly works to preserve in-group status and 
their related contextual identity. “Dishonesty begets dishonesty.”147 
Indeed, some studies find that even a single individual impacts others’ 
dishonesty decision if they share the same social identity.148 
This can have systemic effects across whole industries. Consider a 
fascinating, if depressing, study regarding something called 
“identity-priming.”149 The study recruited bank employees, half working 
in a core business unit, such as private bankers, traders, etc., and the other 
half coming from support units, such as risk, or human resources.150 
Recruits were asked to toss a coin ten times and report the outcomes, 
winning either twenty dollars or nothing for each toss depending on 
whether they reported “heads” or “tails.”151 They were self-reporting and 
knew that they were unobserved; thus the recruits were purposefully 
positioned so as to enable cheating while, at the same time, they were 
afforded the opportunity to hide behind an uncontestable claim that chance 
was responsible for their good fortune.152 Related studies have shown that, 
most often, people fail to take full advantage of such opportunities due to 
the coercive force of an “honesty norm” that erodes one’s positive self-
image when cheating.153 
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Here, however, the researchers entered a novel element. Before 
conducting the coin-toss task, participants were asked to fill out a short 
survey. Some were asked about their professional background (e.g., “What 
is your function at this bank?”), while those in the control condition were 
asked questions unrelated to their profession (e.g., “How many hours per 
week do you watch television on average?”).154 By design, for those 
recruits who were asked about their work, their professional identity was 
intentionally called to mind, or “rendered salient,” for them.155 And, as the 
study’s authors remind us, “[i]dentities are associated with specific social 
norms prescribing permissible behaviours.”156 
This mattered in the study. Statistical analysis shows that the control 
group behaved honestly, reporting successful coin flips (and winning 
twenty dollars) in 51.6% of the cases—not far from the 50–50 odds.157 
Recruits whose professional identity as a banker had been primed by the 
survey, however, reported successful coin flips 58.2% of the time—
significantly above what mere chance would permit. “Our results suggest 
that bank employees’ compliance with the honesty norm was weakened in 
the professional identity condition,” the study’s authors write.158 
The experiment was then repeated with a group of recruits from 
outside the financial industry. Again, some of the recruits had their 
professional identity “primed” while others did not. In this case, the 
identity-priming had no measurable effect: both the control group and the 
primed group reported substantially similar results (e.g., little to no 
cheating). The experiment was then run with a group of students. And 
again, the honesty norm was found to prevail in both the primed and the 
control groups. Only with bankers did identity-priming prompt increased 
cheating. “Our results suggest that the prevailing business culture in the 
banking industry favours dishonest behaviour and thus has contributed to 
the loss of the industry’s reputation,” the authors conclude.159 
Damon Centola studies “social epidemiology” (that is, behavioral 
contagion) at the University of Pennsylvania. He observes a distinction 
between “simple contagions” that are driven by mere exposure—like 
ordering more food if the waiter is obese—and “complex contagions” 
which require certain social dynamics if behavior is to spread.160 “The 
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costlier, higher risk, or less familiar a behavior is, the more that the 
decision to adopt depends upon social confirmation,” he writes.161 Centola 
has found that we require “multiple sources of exposure” to a risky 
behavior before contagion effects appear. This is the “common is moral” 
heuristic at work: the riskier the behavior, “the more that success [of the 
contagion effect] depends upon close-knit networks to establish trusted 
relationships and provide social reinforcement for participation.”162  
Our trust networks thus enable—indeed they prompt—complex 
behavioral contagion. Man’s “being a part-ness” is not an unalloyed good: 
behavioral imperatives that serve to sustain in-group status may promote 
mis-behavior, as judged from an out-group perspective. And behaviors 
that spread via complex contagion are sticky: “The factors that create 
resistance to a behavior before adoption may also become the reasons for 
sticking with it after adoption,” Centola suggests.163 
You are the company that keeps you. The groups to which we gain 
admittance in life shape our behavior. Initially, this is through a “peer 
pressure” function that activates our evolutionarily adaptive tendency 
towards normative compliance; thereafter, through an internalization of 
group behavioral norms. This has implications in the workplace. “Identity 
economics,” as Akerlof terms it, “suggests that a firm operates well when 
employees identify with it and when their norms advance its goals.”164 But 
studies show that workers most often identify with their immediate 
workgroup, rather than with the organization as a whole.165 And those with 
whom employees choose to interact, Centola tells us, is determined less so 
by the conscious choices of individuals and more so “by the structure of 
the social world they inhabit, the identities it activates, and the 
interdependence that it creates.”166 
“We live in this web of social relationships, and a lot of what we do 
and the satisfaction we derive comes from the web of social relationships,” 
writes MIT’s Sandy Pentland, author of Social Physics. “[I]f you want to 
get people to coordinate or change their behavior, you have to first and 
foremost deal with the existing web of relationships, rather than treat 
people as isolated individuals.”167 The persistence of mis-conduct scandals 
suggests that management science has yet to recognize this, implying a 
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particular weakness on the part of those responsible for non-financial risk 
management. 
E. Resistance is Futile 
The dominant theme I have sounded repeatedly throughout this 
Article is that the human animal is a social creature; one that thrives within 
collaborative ecosystems bound together most powerfully by shared trust 
ties. Evolution has selected for the collaborative capacity this creates. It is 
the basis of our astounding success as a species. And, as I have argued 
more fully elsewhere, once we learned how to institutionalize trust, to 
enable collaborative relations among strangers, at scale, we unlocked 
prosperity the likes of which were never before known.168 
The erosion of that “trust infrastructure” therefore poses a grave 
threat to the basis of shared prosperity and to the peace that such prosperity 
helps to sustain. I believe this to be the greatest peril we face today, in a 
world full of perils. For without the institutional trust infrastructure that 
forms the basis of collaboration among strangers, at scale and as a 
presumed behavioral norm, we are thrust back into a Hobbesian world of 
rival tribes; one in which life is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and 
short.”169 
Signs of such civilizational degradation are all around us—to include 
within the most prosperous of nations and within the world’s “Great 
Democracies.”170 Reasons for the collapse in institutional trust are perhaps 
many, but I would submit that a central issue is a decline in successful risk 
governance. It may be unusual for those in risk governance roles to think 
of their work in such a grand context but, as economist Luigi Zingales 
notes, “When the fairness of the rules grows questionable and the benefits 
of the system are distributed too unequally, the consensus for free-market 
meritocracy can collapse.”171 Public corruption and corporate misconduct 
must be considered in this light. When “the elites” charged with running 
our institutions are seen repeatedly placing their interests before those of 
the people they are meant to serve, it is little wonder that our shared trust 
infrastructure erodes and that faith in “the system” is lost.172 It is the task 
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of those in risk governance roles to guard against behavior that may result 
in such wholesale disaffection. 
Berle and Dodd were rightly concerned with the economic ecosystem 
of their day. Despite a different locus of emphasis (powerful managers 
versus shareholders for Berle; powerful “legal persons” versus 
stakeholders for Dodd), what the two scholars shared in common was a 
concern for trust. “Agency problems” and the troubles that flow from 
“asymmetries of information” are fundamentally trust problems. The need 
to manage such problems produces “transaction costs.” Through a “nexus 
of contracts,” Coase argued, the firm operates to minimize such costs. 
Legal obligations remove uncertainty, enable trust, and help to get the sand 
out of the gears. All well and good, as far as it goes . . . 
But debates around such legal mechanisms reflect an implicitly 
mechanistic view of the firm, and this metaphor provides for far too 
narrow a conceptualization of its nature. The firm is more than just 
managers, shareholders, and some indistinct mass of interested 
stakeholders. It is made up of people—more so now, in our “knowledge 
economy,” than was the case at the time the Berle, Dodd, and Coase were 
writing.173 Rather than “a nexus of contracts,” the firm must be seen as a 
“nexus of relations,” as Mayer styles it. With Mayer, Fink observes that 
the firm exists to enliven a purpose, and the nexus of relations among the 
employees of a firm must work to facilitate consistent, coherent, 
conscious, and collaborative effort in service of that purpose. Without 
attention to the purpose of a firm, its governance is indeterminate, Mayer 
argues. And what I have hoped to add here is that the governance of a firm 
is equally indeterminate, or at least ineffectual, without a much fleshier 
appreciation of employees than Homo economicus permits.  
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Figure 2 
As Dunbar has found, humans and all primates exist within nested 
social worlds, with a few highly trusted peers at the center and with 
decreasing levels of trust and emotional investment as we extend outwards 
from there. This is true in the organizational context as well: individual 
employees come together in clusters of highly trusted peers. These peer 
trust networks often have little to do with the formal intended ordering of 
the company as envisioned in organizational charts. Rather, they constitute 
what has been called “the company behind the chart.”174  
As in all human social orders, employees behave so as to maintain 
in-group status with these trusted peers. The culture of a group is an 
emergent property that arise from its complex interdependencies and 
relational dynamics. Different communities of common character will 
convene in any organization, and each will have its own normative dictates 
for membership. As such, distinct sub-cultures will exist within the 
organization, and the behavioral norms of those distinct communities may 
and do regularly conflict. 
Most critically for management, the purpose of these communities 
may or may not be consistent with the stated mission, purpose, and values 
of the organization within which they reside. Consider the example above 
from the study of identity-priming among bank employees. Those who 
were seen to engage in greater degrees of cheating when their identities 
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were “primed” were in front line roles. They were bankers. The same 
increase in cheating was not seen to occur among back-office bank 
employees. Same industry, same firms, but different communities, 
different cultures, different behavior. 
This reflects a hereditary trait of humans: “We are compulsively 
driven to belong in groups or to create them as needed,” Wilson writes. 
We regard our own group as superior, and “define our personal identities 
as members within them.”175 We are thus evolutionarily wired such that 
the pursuit of what we perceive to be personal desires or goals are, in fact, 
more often goals that serve the community in which we reside and from 
which our selfs are constituted. By operating through “illusions of 
knowledge” and delusions of “apart-ness,” we mask from consciousness 
the fact that most of our thoughts, decisions, and deeds operate in service 
to others: the group. Ostracism, exclusion, banishment, expulsion of any 
sort is existentially terrifying. “To be kept forcibly in solitude is to be kept 
in pain, and put on the road to madness,”176 Wilson writes.  
Resistance is futile. And failure to recognize this essential aspect of 
human nature is perhaps the great shortcoming of orthodox economics. It 
is why prevailing concepts of “utility maximization” fail to see identity as 
a far more powerful utility than mere financial incentive. It is why 
industry-standard methods of risk governance persistently fail to curb 
culture and conduct related risk within firms. It is why $400 billion in 
punitive fines for misconduct in the banking sector over the last decade 
have not produced desired changes in behavior among employees at 
individual firms. It is why trust in the sector has continued to erode. 
Because its impact on society is so broad, an erosion of trust in the 
financial sector has wide-ranging repercussions: consider the Financial 
Crisis, pointed to by many as the proximate cause of the rancor that 
characterizes daily discourse today.177 The restoration of trust in the 
financial sector should thus be seen as a socio-political imperative as much 
as an economic one. Such trust will not be restored until risk governance 
methods succeed in putting an end to wide-spread misconduct. And risk 
governance will fail until we embrace a fuller appreciation for Man’s 
social nature. 
Human behavior does not occur apart from the communities of 
common character of which any individual forms but a part. Without this 
understanding, the best we can ever do is to address symptoms of corporate 
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malady. We must embrace the complexity of human systems if we wish 
grapple with the underlying causal forces. “The tribal rules are what 
matters,” argues renowned organizational psychologist Ed Schein, “That’s 
where it’s really at. And that’s where leadership is. It’s in the group.”178 
CONCLUSION 
A. Coercive Competition 
In a passionate piece entitled, Why is Economics not an Evolutionary 
Science?,179 Thorstein Veblen argued in 1898 that the field of economics 
was “in need of rehabilitation.”180 The discipline was “behind the times,” 
and chiefly so for a failure to achieve what Wilson would later refer to as 
consilience.181 The problem, for Veblen, was one of a “faulty conception 
of human nature”182 on the part of the economists of his day, whose 
theories relied upon Homo economicus—an isolated “human datum”—
leaving them blind to the fact that “the active material in which the 
economic process goes on is the human material of the industrial 
community.”183 Veblen summarizes much of what I have sought to convey 
here in one neat passage: 
The changes that take place in the mechanical contrivances are an 
expression of changes in the human factor. Changes in the material 
facts breed further change only through the human factor. It is in the 
human material that the continuity of development is to be looked 
for; and it is here, therefore, that the motor forces of the process of 
economic development must be studied if they are to be studied in 
action at all.184 
It is “the human material” that constitutes the firm and provides “the 
motor force” that drives its performance. It is therefore the human material 
to which we must attend if we are to shape desired firm performance. 
“Economic action is teleological,” Veblen argues.185 It reflects the 
underlying purpose of economic actors (firms) and of those who make 
                                                     
 178. See Egon Zehnder, In Conversation with Ed Schein: “Let’s Get to Know Each Other”, 
EGON ZEHNDER (July 9, 2019), https://www.egonzehnder.com/insight/in-conversation-with-ed-
schein [https://perma.cc/CTC2-HWCR]. 
 179. Thorstein Veblen, Why is Economics Not an Evolutionary Science?, 12 Q.J. ECON. 373, 373 
(1898). 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 389. 
 183. Id. at 387. 
 184. Id. at 388 (emphasis added). 
 185. Id. at 391. 
2020] Coercive Competition 797 
them up (human beings). “All economic change is a change in the 
economic community,” Veblen concludes.186 
It is time we heeded him. If we are to effectively manage and govern 
the firm, we must start from this conception of the firm as a nexus, not just 
of relations, but of relations between individuals interacting within 
communities, and between distinct communities (“Superminds”) 
interacting with one another within any given firm. Each community will 
have its own set of behavioral norms—a culture—which will inform the 
identity of its members. Compliance with these cultural dictates is 
mandatory to maintained group membership. Thus, individual behavior is 
shaped so as to promote the interests of the community, regardless of the 
immediately apparent interests of a given community member. 
Indeed, the imperative of normative compliance shapes the behavior 
of individual actors so much so as to prompt behavior that is oftentimes 
clearly contrary to individual economic self-interest. Individual interests, 
goals, ambitions, preferences, desires, etc., may and do conflict with the 
behavioral dictates of the community(-ies) within which an employee 
operates. In such circumstances, it is community interests that most often 
prevail. “Identity can account for many phenomena that current economics 
cannot well explain,” writes Akerlof. This includes acting in ways that are 
detrimental to our obvious individual well-being and which therefore 
appear, at surface, to be irrational.187 
Moreover, the cultural inclinations of a given community can and do 
conflict with those of other communities within the same organization. 
This includes the community of senior managers, that of “the C-suite,” 
that of the board, and on up through to the broadest concept of the 
“stakeholder community.” Each of these communities of interest will 
assert normative force, but coercive energy dissipates the further we move 
away from the center of a given employee’s most densely trusted peer-
network.188 What follows from this is that each employee becomes the 
subject of a “coercive competition” between these distinct communities. 
A simple graphic illustrates how an employee may operate when torn 
between the cultural norms of two communities of personal relevance.  
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Figure 3: Starling Dynamic Culture Model 
 
Let the Y-axis represent normative pressures from the “formal” 
organization and the X-axis represent that from among more closely 
trusted peers. Employees will be rewarded for compliance (and punished 
for a lack of compliance) with normative dictates along either axis.189 How 
an employee acts to balance these competing pressures produces four 
possible outcomes in this admittedly overly simplistic model. 
 Teacher’s Pet: The employee conforms to the normative dictates 
of the formal organization and rejects those of his or her more 
closely trusted peers. Other names commonly used to describe 
this individual are “climber” and “ass-kisser.” 
 Rogue Employee: The employee disregards the behavioral norms 
insisted upon by both the formal organization and those of his or 
her immediate peer group. Compliance personnel and those in 
“surveillance and monitoring” functions typically focus their 
resources here, in a hunt for the “malicious insider.” 
 Model Citizen: When the normative dictates of both the formal 
organization and those of one’s most closely trusted peers are 
aligned, and an employee may act in concert with both and 
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receive applause from both constituencies, we have the ideal 
outcome. 
 The Cool Kids: When the normative dictates of the formal 
organization conflict with those of one’s trusted peer group, the 
disproportionately greater weighting we give to those within the 
innermost of our Dunbar social circles drives us to conform to 
our peers’ expectations at the expense of the formal organization. 
 
Again, this is an overly simplistic model. It ignores, for instance, that 
the employee belongs, not just to two, but to many “communities” within 
the organization. The model fails to illustrate how coercive competition 
plays out in that matrixed context. Nevertheless, it serves well enough to 
illustrate the concluding point I wish to make with this Article.  
I submit that the central task of those in risk governance roles is to 
establish and maintain the broadest possible cultural coherence among 
these distinct communities, conscientiously striving to minimize the 
degree of coercive competition to which employees are subject. At a 
minimum, they should seek to inquire intelligently into these dynamics. 
To begin, one might start by seeking to create a scatter plot that posits 
individual employees within each of the four quadrants in my model. The 
shape of that graph alone provides actionable insights. For instance, the 
graph below might signal a healthy firm with broad cultural cohesion (e.g., 
one might expect to see a graph like this in the Marine Corps). 
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Figure 4 
By contrast, a graph such as that below would seem to indicate a 
company that is at war with itself (e.g., the proverbial “nerds” versus the 
“jocks” in any given high school . . . ?). 
Figure 5 
One senior bank executive—the former COO of one of the world’s 
leading firms—suggests in private discussions that the plot he would 
expect to see would likely look more like the image immediately below. 
(“The ‘cool kids’ are the ones that keep me up at night,” he remarked.) 
2020] Coercive Competition 801 
Figure 6 
It is also important to keep in mind that these employees exist in 
networks, which can also be illustrated in the following graphical form.  
Figure 7 
 
This is not unimportant, as Nicholas Christakis explains. “Consider 
the metaphor of carbon atoms. Each is identical to the next but, grouped 
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together, different groupings have different properties. Assembled one 
way, the atoms form graphite—dark and soft. Assembled differently, those 
very same atoms form diamond—clear and hard. Group structure is 
deterministic.”190 The same is true for the “structure” of social networks 
within organizations: different structures yield different emergent 
properties, such as normative dictates, or “culture.” This implies that both 
social network structure and the social dynamics of cultural compulsion 
warrant close scrutiny if we wish to anticipate, and shape, the 
“mechanisms” of organizational performance.  
Security expert Bruce Schneier lists four principal mechanisms for 
inducing normative compliance in the organizational context, “coercive 
mechanisms that induce people to cooperate, act in the group interest, and 
follow group norms.”191 
 
1. Institutional pressure, in the form of rules or laws that induce 
compliant behavior through the threat of sanctions, operating 
among the top two quadrants in my “coercive competition” 
model above. It is here that we see the normative force of the 
formal organization, typically expressed through the incentive 
scheme and the compliance function at most organizations and 
tested for through tick-box audit exercises. 
2. Security systems, which are designed to catch bad actors, 
“things that only work after the fact, like forensic and audit 
systems.” This is the domain of surveillance and monitoring, 
targeting the “rogue employee” in my model above. Though the 
malicious insider can cause great harm, it should be noted that 
only a very small percentage of the population are likely to 
evince either the psychopathic or sociopathic tendencies 
necessary to wholly reject the behavioral norms of both the 
formal organization and those of one’s immediate peer group 
(estimates are less than 5%192). 
3. Moral pressure, which comes from “inside our own heads” and 
which is therefore intimately tied up with considerations of self-
identity. It is here that we see an emphasis on “tone from the top” 
and company codes of ethics, piously rehearsed at employee 
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town-hall meetings and reiterated through mandatory ethics 
training programs, screened for in pre-employment 
psychological surveys, and tested for subsequently through 
employee engagement surveys. To the extent that it is effective 
at all, this force is most likely found operating in the top-right 
quadrant of my model. 
4. Reputational pressure, which Schneier describes as “a wholly 
different, and much stronger, type of pressure [that] comes from 
how others respond to our actions.” This coercive mechanism 
functions in the top-left quadrant (“Teacher’s Pet”) and in the 
bottom-right quadrant (“The Cool Kids”). But, given what 
Dunbar teaches us about the decreasing emotional force we 
experience the farther we move from our social centers, it should 
be clear that the coercive power of reputation in the top-left 
quadrant is several orders of magnitude less than it is at the 
bottom-right. As I have sought to argue throughout the entirety 
of this Article, it is here that we find the greatest coercive force 
in any human social order, to include the firm. And yet, at most, 
it is managed through little more than “management intuition.” 
 
Our failure to manage culture and conduct-related risks within 
firms—in the financial sector and in most others as well—stems from a 
failure to recognize the behavior-shaping force of coercive competition, to 
appreciate that this reflects eons of evolutionary selective pressure that 
defines the very nature of the human animal, and to conceive of the firm 
as a nexus of relations across which these dynamics play out. 
These ideas have macro-economic implications. “Because firms and 
other organizations are the backbone of all economies,” Akerlof writes, 
“[identity economics] transforms our understanding of what makes 
economies work or fail.”193 And they have micro-economic implications 
as well. “Once organizational networks can be measured, they can be 
controlled,” Centola writes. “The most important implication here is that 
managers can design organizational networks to provide a structural 
foundation for accelerating the dynamics of change.”194 This will 
necessarily involve illuminating the sources and dynamics of coercive 
competition within a firm, and it is to this opportunity that we must now 
turn our attention. 
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B. Where to from Here? 
MIT’s Tom Malone notes that no serious company would be run 
without some accounting system that could track and consolidate 
combined results across all of its disparate business units. “In the future,” 
he writes, “it may become just as unthinkable to run a serious organization 
that doesn’t do something similar with many other—much more 
subjective—kinds of information. In fact,” he continues, “our great-
grandchildren may find it hard to understand how the organizations we 
belong to in the early 21st century could have made so many of their 
decisions with their eyes—figuratively—closed.”195 
“As we continue to see the impact of technology and big data in other 
parts of financial services, one interesting question is how innovation and 
enhanced technology will support the measurement and management of 
culture,” noted Kevin Stiroh, head of Supervision for the New York 
Federal Reserve Bank, in a recent speech. “For example, we might see 
firms routinely leverage broader data to make stronger predictions about 
potential misconduct risk . . . .”196 
New technologies in the realm of “computational social science” 
offer much promise here.197 These tools allow us to map interpersonal trust 
networks within organizations and to measure some of their behavior-
shaping dynamics by sifting indicative—and predictive—signals from 
within readily available company data sets, yielding heretofore 
unavailable insights into the drivers of employee conduct.198 
In an example of consilience that might please E. O. Wilson, these 
social technologies have evolved from the application of computing power 
in the natural sciences: computational social science is derived from earlier 
work in the field of computational biology,199 which is at the root of many 
astonishing achievements in genetic engineering.200 Perhaps what 
computational biology permits for in the realm of “precision medicine”201 
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might be mirrored in the field of computational social science, permitting 
for “precision management”?  Or, at least, “precision risk management.” 
The power of such Computational Social Science techniques is 
illustrated by recent research conducted at Stanford and Berkeley,202 where 
researchers sought to determine whether firm culture could be shown to 
be tied to specific performance outcomes and, if so, whether cultural 
drivers of such outcomes might leave discernible artefacts in electronic 
communications data such as email. “Organizational scholars have long 
recognized the importance of culture in shaping individual, group, and 
organizational success[,]”203 the researchers had observed, but 
“compelling theoretical accounts of the dynamics of cultural fit and its 
consequences remain largely absent from the literature.”204 
In a novel approach, they looked at how new employees in an 
organization demonstrate “normative compliance” by adopting the norms 
for language use in email communications that prevail among their new 
peers. The researchers identified and traced three distinct “encultration 
trajectories” that correlated, with high predictive reliability, to specific 
individual and organizational outcomes. Equipped with some 10 million 
emails exchanged among 600 employees over a five-year period, and 
human resource records that included things like employee age, gender, 
tenure, and, for employees who had left the company, whether their 
departure was voluntary or involuntary, the researchers found that email 
language use among all new employees was initially out of step with 
organizational norms. However, once those norms were learned, the study 
discerned three common “signatures” within the data, which I will term 
(1) “accept and adopt,” (2) “reject and eject,” and (3) “reject and defect.” 
Employees showing the first “signature” in their electronic 
communication patterns—that is, those who were “normatively 
compliant”—were found to evince higher job satisfaction, motivation and 
discretionary effort, greater attachment to the company and longer tenure, 
as well as to deliver higher levels of both individual and firm performance 
outcomes. And for the other two signatures? “Newcomers who do not 
rapidly conform to cultural norms are rejected by their colleagues and 
ultimately forced to exit,” the researchers found, “whereas those who had 
successfully enculturated earlier in their careers but subsequently 
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exhibited a decline in cultural fit appeared to be detaching from the 
organization and subsequently exited voluntarily.”205 
Studies of this sort demonstrate the potential for computational social 
science to transform how firms might investigate the cultural dynamics 
and behavioral predispositions among their staff by making use of 
commonly available and company-owned data sets. When adequately 
informed by learnings from behavioral science, these tools may produce 
deeply penetrative insights into the drivers of employee behavior and 
organizational outcomes. 
Companies in the regulatory technology, or “RegTech,” space are 
making use of these methodologies to identify and mitigate behavioral 
risks that are not sufficiently well captured by current standard metrics and 
governance processes, promising to transform the corporate and risk 
governance landscape. By illuminating the dynamics of coercive 
competition, behavioral “early warning systems” position firm leaders to 
intervene, proactively, with a view to encouraging desirable cultural and 
conduct norms as well as to anticipating and curbing the spread of likely 
behaviors inconsistent with a firm’s mission or values. 
“The most beautiful as well as the most ugly inclinations of man are 
not part of a fixed and biologically given human nature,” Fromm wrote, 
“but result from the social process which creates man.”206 We must devise 
a better means of enquiring into such processes.  
By bringing quantitative metrics to the qualitative challenge of 
human behavior, RegTech firms and other computational social science 
pioneers can help management to assess culture and conduct risk to an 
unprecedented degree, and perhaps to avoid unnecessary costs to 
shareholders, customers, employees and society. In so doing, they may 
help to restore trustworthiness to our critical social institutions. 
This is the moral task of our time. 
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